The political balance of trade ... ? ? by Rashid, Salim

UNIVERSITY OF
ILLINOIS LIBRARY
AT URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
BOOKSTACKS
be charged a mmim, * ,ow - You may
JAN 4 2000
NOV 2^
1999
L162

STX BEBR
FACULTY WORKING
PAPER NO. 89-1536
The Political Balance of Trade . . . ? ?
TH? UBRArtY Or THE
j 4 1989
"
Salim Rashid
College of Commerce and Business Administration
Bureau of Economic and Business Research
University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2011 with funding from
University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
http://www.archive.org/details/politicalbalance1536rash
BEBR
FACULTY WORKING PAPER NO. 89-1536
College of Commerce and Business Administration
University of Illinois at Urbana- Champaign
February 1989
The Political Balance of Trade
. . . ? ?
Salim Rashid, Professor
Department of Economics

ABSTRACT
The prevailing belief, dating from Adam Smith, that the balance-
of-trade was the dominant facet of English economic policy since the
time of Thomas Mun, is questioned. It is argued that Samuel Fortrey
is a more likely "founder" for this doctrine and that the influence of
the balance-of-trade is due almost entirely to politics.

THE POLITICAL BALANCE OF TRADE . . . ? ?
"Before they learn there Is a God to be worshipped they learn
there are Frenchmen to be detested," Fougebert de Montbron, quoted by
Roy Porter, English Society in the Eighteenth Century *
It is well-known that concern for the Balance-of-Trade is the
distinguishing mark of the economic thought of the century prior to
Adam Smith. No one would deny that the balance-of-trade is one impor-
tant aspect of trade. What is striking is the enormous importance
attached to the Balance-of-Trade under the Mercantile System. Was the
almost hysterical stress laid upon the Balance-of-Trade a sign of
demented economic thought or was the hysteria a cover for some non-
economic objectives of the pamphleteers? Adam Smith attributed the
Balance-of-Trade doctrine—a phase I shall use throughout to indicate
the near exclusive emphasis given to this concept— to a failure to
distinguish real from nominal wealth and suggested that the doctrine
originated with Thomas Mun In the 1620s. In this paper, I shall try
to focus more precisely on the rise of the Balance-of-Trade
(interpreted in the extreme sense noted above) in order to suggest
that Thomas Mun had very little to do with the rise of this doctrine.
Rather, Samuel Fortrey appears to have been the most influential
figure in arousing popular concern. This suggests that the doctrine
of the Balance-of-Trade may have been a cover for discussing the non-
economic dangers of the Anglo-French Trade and, if the conjecture is
reasonable, it would require a substantial change in our view about
"Mercantilism."
A long-established tradition in the history of economic thought
credits the East India merchant, Thomas Mun, with being the chief
-2-
architect of what Adam Smith called "The Mercantile System," whose
principal doctrines are to be found by examining the balance of trade.
Of the innumerable company of English mercantilist
writers and pamphleteers, one has, by common con-
sent, a pre-eminent claim to be chosen as spokesman
of the somewhat heterogeneous group. It is not
merely that Thomas Mun (1571-1641) approaches most
nearly to a systematic statement of mercantilist
principles; of no less importance is the fact that
he wrote at a time when Mercantilism was yet
scarcely exposed to the disintegrating forces which
made the mercantilist of the middle and later peri-
ods in some respects anticipators of a more liberal
policy.
Nonetheless, scholars who have explored the doctrines embodied in the
balance of trade have concluded that nothing was invented in the
2
1620' s except the phrase. The suggestion that Mun's ideas circulated
widely in manuscript and influenced policy even before the publication
of Mun's pamphlet in 1664 is unlikely because of the high likelihood
of publication having been decided upon by the government in 1664 in
3
order to provoke anti-Dutch feeling. Indeed, for someone who is
reputed to have founded an "ism," it is the paucity of references to
Mun that is striking. This would suggest that Mercantilism, as
characterized by a discovery of the importance of the balance of
trade, probably did not begin in the 1620' s.
While the primary focus of this paper is upon the Balance-of-
Trade, it is worth refering briefly to a second aspect of
Mercantilism, also developed in Book IV of the Wealth of Nations , that
of protection to domestic industries. If protection for domestic
industries is taken to characterize the Mercantile System, then we
have to explain why duties upon both exports and imports were low and
-3-
equal upon the accession of William III in 1688 and only slowly
altered into a protective system by the second decade of the
eighteenth century. The empirical evidence flatly contradicts the
supposition that protection was a dominant feature of English
Commercial Policy prior to 1690.
There are two main issues connected with the Balance of Trade.
First, why was a favorable balance of trade so frequently and so
emphatically desired by English political economists between
1600-1750? Secondly, since the political economists of this period
also had other goals, what was the relative importance of the balance
of trade and why did its relative importance change over time? It has
been frequently remarked that politics dominated economics at this era
but the observation has not been satisfactorily applied. Scholars
have generally been content to accept Adam Smith's characterization of
the balance of trade as a Midas-like hunt for the precious metals and
his ascription of influence to Thomas Mun has led to the latter being
generally credited as the "founder" of the "balance-of-trade dogma."
It will be argued here that the rise of the balance-of-trade as a
talisman of economic policy owes much to Anglo-French relations be-
4
tween 1660 and 1720, a point originally made by William Ashley. When
Anglo-French conflict became less acute in the years that followed,
the use of the Balance of Trade declined. Such an interpretation
helps to synthesize various disparate interpretations extant in the
literature, such as the emphasis on specific balances in the overall
balance-of-trade, the Tory origins of Free-Trade policy, and the rise
of protection as an aspect of English Trade policy.
-4-
II. In the Wealth of Nations Adam Smith provided a carefully ambi-
guous account of Thomas Mun's influence. We are simply informed that
The title of Mun's book, England's Treasure in
Foreign Trade, became a fundamental maxim in the
political economy, not of England only, but of all
other commercial countries.
We are not told when Mun's book was written, when it was published,
whether the book itself was influential or whether its title merely
reflected an accepted policy. Since Mun's views were first published
in 1621, then developed further in 1628, his manuscript (supposedly)
circulated extensively in the 1630 's and the work itself was published
only in 1664, Smith's account does little to inform us about the
actual influence of the Balance-of-Trade policy.
In his Lectures on Jurisprudence Smith is much more informative
about the growth of balance-of-trade doctrines. In LJ(A) we are told
of the origins of the Mercantile System that:
The wealth of the kingdom has by allmost <?all> the
authors after Mun been considered as the gold and
silver in it. In his book... he endavours to show
the ballance of trade is the only thing which can
support England... On this doctrine of his, which
however foolish has been adopted by all succeeding
writers.
.
This system, so different from that I have been
endavouring to explain, had been hinted at by pre-
ceding writers, but Mr. Mun was the first who formed
it into a regular system.
Smith goes on to point out that John Locke provided a more philosophi-
cal, but no more successful, defense of these notions. A little
later, however, his chronology appears to change
No nation can be ruined by the ballance of trade
being against them... This indeed has been the cry,
ever since the time of Ch. 2"
,
and notwithstanding
of this country has continually improved in riches,
in strength and opulence (emphasis added).
-5-
LJ(B) does not add anything of significance (pp. 507-510), so it is
appropriate to consider Smith's qualification, "ever since the time of
Ch. 2 ." Why does Smith focus upon this period, i.e., after 1660? He
must have known from the prefactory account written by Mun's son that
Thomas Mun had written the pamphlet much earlier and that he was long
since dead?
The choice of this period is however most interesting because it
shows Smith's perceptive recognition of the fact that a new emphasis
was being given to the balance of trade at this period. Smith offers
no explanation for this sudden rise nor does he suggest that the
importance of the doctrine had declined in the eighteenth century
—
indeed he tries to emphasize that the doctrine was still dominant in
his own day.
Why should the English worry so much about the specific balance of
trade with France—contrary to Jacob Viner's claim that specific
balances mattered only as part of the general balance of trade? It
is necessary to review some of the prominant features of the political
scene, especially since these have not been utilized by most
historians of economic thought who have examined Mercantilist ideas.
Charles II gave the English nobility and clergy much to worry about.
The Restoration had provided Charles II with an income dependent upon
the Customs revenues and hence upon the balance of trade. The greater
the volume of foreign trade, the greater the King's revenues, and
henceforth "Free-Trade" was much in favor among the Tories. A nation
that had been reluctant to pay Ship-money for fear that Charles'
father would become too strong could be expected to be suspicious
-6-
about making Charles overly independent. So careful were some
Englishmen on this point that in 1673 and 1674, even while urging
Charles to publicly enter the war against France, some of the most
Protestant and patriotic leaders of the opposition were secretly
meeting the French ambassador.
Charles' evident partiality for Roman Catholicism, his ties with
France and his admiration for his french cousin, Louis XIV, soon
aroused suspicion. The measures of religious toleration that he ini-
tially espoused were seen as a cover for helping Roman Catholics.
Charles' marriage in 1662 with the Portuguese princess, Catherine of
Braganza, instead of a Protestant princess could also be interpreted
similarly, as would the appointment of Catholic sympathizers such as
Henry Bennet to Secretary of State in 1661 (to the evident dissatis-
faction of his main counsellor, the strongly Protestant Earl of
Clarendon)
.
Actually, Charles did not have to do very much to arouse English
suspicions. The policies of Louis XIV would have put on guard even an
indifferent spectator. The natural wealth of the French had long been
obvious and the following comments of an Italian in 1661 reflects a
9
virtually unanimous opinion.
Heaven itself has given the nation almost miraculous
gifts. It is full of fertile land . . . excellently
situated upon two oceans, watered by many navigable
rivers . . . well-populated . . . rich in wealth and
in soldiers.
Immediately after taking over power personally in 1661, Louis made
his presence felt. In October 1661 Louis used a quarrel between the
-7-
French and Spanish ambassadors in London to force Che Spanish ambassa-
dor in France to provide a public apology and thereby humiliate his
father-in-law, the King of Spain. The Spanish got the better of the
French in the fights that took place in London and Samuel Pepys
observed that "all the city did rejoice. And indeed we do naturally
all love the Spanish and hate the French." In 1662, the French
ambassador in Rome deliberately picked a quarrel with the Pope, then
made the Pope apologize and even insisted upon the erection of a pyra-
mid as an expression of papal sorrow.
That 46 thousand men has passed through Lyons to
Marselliers and so for Italie, I am an eye-wittness
of it and there are more daily passing notwithstand-
ing the articles and the Piramede which is erected
in Rome very high for the King <of> France and so
proude that none but the Italiens would suffer it.
More directly insulting was the order issued to Louis to English
warships to salute the French flag in the Mediterranean. Louis even
discovered a local law of succession in Brabant that would influence
the heir to the ailing King of Spain and gave him a reason for inter-
fering in the affairs of that Kingdom. Samuel Pepys noted in his
Diary for 1663:
The Duke also told us of several Christian
commanders (French) gone over to the Turkes
to serve them; and upon inquiry I find that
the King of France do by this aspire to the
Empire, and so to get the Crowne of Spayne
also upon the death of the King, which is
very probable, it seems.
The attention paid by French ministers such as Mazarin and Colbert
to the needs of war is neatly summed up in Colbert's phrase "Trade is
the source of [public] finance and [public] finance is the vital nerve
-8-
of war." It was only to be expected that the English would retaliate
with similar sentiments. The clearest statement of this is to be
found in an (undated) memorandum of Lord Shaftesbury.
That which makes the Consideration of Trade of far
greater import now than ever is that the Interest
of Commerce, though formerly neglected, is of late
years Become an Express Affair of State as well
with the French as with the Hollander and Swede.
And because it is understood by latter experience
to be more Conducing towards an universal Monarchy
(either for the gaining or preventing of it) then
either an Army or Territory, though never so great,
of which Instances out of several kingdoms might
easily be Produced, In regard It is Trade and
Commerce alone that draweth store of wealth along
with it and its Potency at sea By shipping which
is not otherwise to be had.
It is in this atmosphere of growing distrust and suspicion that
the pamphlet of Samuel Fortrey should be placed.
-9-
III. Samuel Fortrey was "one of the Gentlemen of his Majesties most
Honourable Privy Chamber." Fortrey' s pamphlet England's Interest and
Improvement was published in 1663 and, significantly, dedicated to
12
Charles II. ' It is a pamphlet deserving of much greater attention
than has hitherto been given to it. For more than a half-century,
this pamphlet and its figures were quoted as demonstrating the injury
received by trade with France. The pamphlet is an able one, which
begins by noting that England's prosperity lies in increasing its
Store (Production) and Trade (Exchange). The easy acceptance of
industrious foreigners is urged and the dangers to religion from
greater toleration considered and shown to be minimal. (A topical
issue!) Fortrey' s acuteness in the pursuit of profit—a property he
attributed to mankind in general— is repeatedly shown. He urges the
cultivation of items "which are of least charge at home, and greatest
value abroad." On these grounds he strongly supports enclosures, a
topic heatedly debated in the 1650' s, and also supports monopolies for
trade when the monopoly can be effective. The fact that a profit
oriented individual wishes to do something is a strong ground for per-
13
mitting the thing to be done, according to Fortrey.
First, that inclosures would not have been
opposed, had it not appeared, that most landlords
endeavoured it; which is a greater argument of
Improvement; for did not the landlord suppose it
would improve his land to a higher value; he would
never have been persuaded to do it; and the reason
why it would have been of greater advantage to the
landlord, is because the tenant could make more
profit of it, or else we should not fine them so
greedy after pasture.
It cannot be said that the pamphlet was only aimed at the Balance of
Trade, even though this is the point that attracted the greatest
-10-
attention. On pages 21-30 Fortrey provides a list of items showing
the yearly loss of £1,600,000 to England, suggests that the English
take steps to patronize their own products and reject French ones, and
draws up rules for treating imports in a manner familiar to all stu-
dents of this literature. Fortrey goes on to claim that laws to pro-
hibit the transport of bullion are needless, since the flow will
follow the balance of trade.
All the ideas connected with Mercantilist trade are clearly and
concisely described by Fortrey. It is only a year later that Thomas
Mun's England's Treasure by Foreign Trade was first published by
Richard Mun, the son of Thomas. Richard's claim that the manuscript
had circulated widely has not been independently confirmed. McCulloch
claimed that the publication of Mun's work was to support the policy
14
of free export of bullion which was permitted in 1663. Even if this
be true, and no evidence has hiterto been provided to support the con-
jecture, it is worth noting that the policy itself was advocated a
year earlier by Fortrey, and apparently discussed by him at the court
before the measure was enacted. The evidence would therefore suggest
that it is Fortrey who initiated concern with the balance of trade,
particularly with France, and that Mun's work, apart from its service-
ability against the Dutch, was perhaps published to take advantage of
the concern created by Fortrey.
There is only one point in Fortrey' s pamphlet that appears to sup-
port the Midas fallacy.
the only way to be rich, is to have plenty of that
commodity to vent, that is of greatest value abroad;
for what the price of anything is amongst our selves,
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whether dear or cheap it matters not; for as we pay,
so we receive, and the country is nothing damnified
by it; but the art is when we deal with shortages,
to sell dear and to buy cheap.
This is consistent with the notion that gold and silver are the only
forms of real wealth. The rest of the pamphlet does not support this
notion and, he even directly contradicts the raoney-is-wealth notion
when he writes, a little later, that "our money and coin, which is
also a commodity as well as the rest [of commodities] ."
At a critical point in his argument, just after showing the loss
16
to France, he states
our treasure must needs be wasted to even the
balance; and so our own people remain idle and
poor . . .
This stress upon employment is not new but only continues a theme
earlier introduced when Fortrey spoke of the benefits of manufac-
17
tures.
In the next place, our manufactures are to be con-
sidered, on which chiefly depends both the wealth
and prosperity of this kingdom; for by the increase
and encouragement thereof, the Subjects are iraployed
in industrious callings, maintained and preserved
from want, and those mischiefs which commonly attend
idleness: the people furnished at home with all
things both of necessity and pleasure and by the
overplus procure from abroad, what ever for use or
delight is wanting.
A careful study of the pamphlet literature does not provide evi-
dence to support the notion that Thomas Mun initiated the emphasis
upon Balance-of-Trade. Since the fact of such an emphasis is
undoubted, someone presumably has to take the "blame" for having begun
the Balance-of-Trade scare. Samuel Fortrey appears to be the only
plausible candidate for such a role in the years 1663-64.
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IV. Most of the rest of the story has been carefully told by Ashley,
in his justly famous paper on "The Tory Origins of Free Trade Policy,"
so it is necessary to make only brief reference to subsequent events.
The increasingly close relationship of Charles II with Louis XIV,
including a secret treaty, subsidies and even a french mistress. The
Whig party steadily strengthened its anti-Catholic and anti-absolute
raonarchial stance and therefore anti-French attitude. In 1667 Colbert
introduced a tariff that was practically prohibitive and destructive
of the English woolen market. In 1673, Fortrey's pamphlet was re-
printed and Fortrey reported an increase in general interest in his
ideas. Finally, in 1674, a group of 14 important Whig merchants pro-
duced "A Scheme of Trade" in which the overbalance with France was set
18
at a million pounds. Anti-French feeling grew in strength and in
1678 an Act was passed prohibiting the import of many French goods
including Wine, Brandy, Cloth and Silks. A pamphlet war was set in
motion and Ashley has focussed on the fact that most of the arguments
for free-trade with France have considerable theoretical gaps and are
more properly attributed to the Tory sympathies of their authors than
to calm intellectual convictions. This aspect of Ashley's argument
cannot be faulted. However by focussing upon free-trade he has
touched upon something that had a limited influence between 1680 and
1715—by dealing with the Balance of Trade instead, Ashley would have
been able to illuminate a concept that spanned the entire period from
the Restoration of Charles II to the publication of the Wealth of
Nations . Indeed, despite his open sympathy with the Historical School
of Economics, Ashley often writes as though the free-trade point of
view is the only "scientific" one.
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The main point of difference between Ashley and this essay lies in
dating the beginnings of the balance-of-trade scare. The emphasis of
Mun's pamphlet was primarily anti-Dutch. While English policy was
concerned with both the Dutch and the French in 1660, the alarm over
the Balance of Trade does not appear to have included the Dutch at any
19
point. As an examination of the pamphlets of the period, such as
those of Sir Josiah Child or of Dudley North, will show, it was the
interest rate that attracted attention when the Dutch were considered.
In any case, the Dutch were clearly beaten and outdistanced by the
English in the 1680' s and henceforth the French were the primary con-
cern of the English. Ashley notes some antecedents of the Scheme of
Trade but nonetheless considers 1674 to be a critical date. On the
other hand, it has been argued above that antipathy to the French
increased steadily between 1660 and 1663. There are further reasons
for considering the years 1660-1663 as important for the growth of the
balance-of-trade doctrine. Charles Davenant, in reviewing the growth
of English commercial policy, notes the rise of anti-French sentiment
20from 1660 onwards
About the year 1660 . . . France became the rising
empire. And it rose so fast as to beget just appre-
hensions to England for our future safety. In the
meanwhile several good patriots, perceiving the
Court then fatally running into French interest and
measures, and finding it would be difficult to en-
gage the people (newly come out of a civil war) to
follow and join with them in more national councils,
by speculations merely political concerning the
progress of the French arms and power, they thought
the best course to awaken Englishmen was to alarm
them about the danger they were in to lose their
trade; and, for this reason, nothing was so common
as to cry 'that England was undone by the prodigious
overbalance the French had upon us.'
-14-
Margaret Priestley has pointed out how there were extensive nego-
tiations for an Anglo-French commercial treaty between 1663 and
1672—a concern that seems explicable by the thesis that the balance-
of-trade had risen to the status of a bogey by the time of Fortrey'
s
pamphlet. Indeed, when figures were drawn up on this issue, the
figures for 1662 and 1673 were considered. Why were these dates cho-
sen? Whether we settle upon 1663 or 1673, it is clear in either case
that Thomas Mun's pamphlet had little to do with the rise of the
balance of trade to prominence. When Fortrey wrote England's Interest
he made it clear that he was only expressing what all "ingenious per-
sons" always knew, so that he was original only in the narrow sense.
Insofar as the English needed a pedagogue to impress them with the
importance of the balance of trade it is Samuel Fortrey and not Thomas
21
Mun who fills that role.
The concern for French power is visible in the writings of almost
all English travelers in France and in 1702, John Northleigh took as
the first reason for the growth of French power an issue directly con-
22
nected with the Balance-of-Trade.
That which has facilitated the French Conquest
is the want of Money in those Neighboring
Countries they have attacked; and where they
cannot pay for their own defense, they always
want hands and hearts to fight for it.
Awareness of the French presence Is visible in the works of English
intellectuals from all fields, whether it be mathematicians such as
John Wallis or poets such as John Dryden. When the cosmopolitan,
Jacob Vanderlint, wrote some 50 years later, he had to insert a quali-
23fication about the French.
-15-
All nations of the world therefore should be
regarded as one body of tradesmen, exercising
their various occupations for the mutual benefit
and advantage of each other ... 1 will not
contend for a free and unrestrained trade with
respect to France, though 1 can't see it could
do us harm even in that case.
Between 1688 and 1815, England and France were locked in a superpower
struggle and were at war approximately one year in two. The fact
that economists also appear to have freely adopted their economics to
their politics has not, however, received adequate notice. The polit-
ical affiliation of men like Charles Davenant or Dudley North has been
fairly obvious but it is only recently that we have come to appreciate
25that Gregory King's famous tabulation hides many Tory prejudices.
More revealing is the fact that Henry Martin, whose Considerations on
the East Indian Trade has long been hailed as one of the landmarks of
free-trade thought, contributed wholeheartedly to the violently anti-
French British Merchant . How is this change explicable unless we
admit the malleability of economics under political pressure?
The importance of the Balance-of-Trade as a critical element in
National Power is also seen in the activities of the philosopher, John
Locke. While the economic arguments of Locke's Considerations clearly
display an appreciation for the free-market, Locke was quite emphatic
27in not allowing foreign trade to regulate itself.
Money also is necessary to us, in a certain
proportion to the plenty of it amongst our
neighbors. For, if any of our neighbors have
it in a much greater abundance than we, we are
many ways obnoxious to them. 1. They can
maintain a greater force. 2. They can tempt
away our people, by greater wages, to serve
them by land or sea, or in any labor. 3. They
can command the markets, and thereby break our
-16-
trade, and make us poor. 4. They can on any
occasion engross naval and warlike stores, and
thereby endanger us.
There can be little doubt that Locke had the French primarily in mind.
The editor of Locke's travel diary, Locke's Travels in France
1675-1679
,
writes that28
Though he is mentioned only seldom by name,
Colbert and his multifarious activities figure
prominently in the pages of the Journal. Besides
his work for the French navy and his conduct of
the French finances during the war years, a subject
to which Locke devoted much space, we see reflected
here his attempt to bring about a great development
of French trade and industry.
Even though it is not explicitly designated as such, a careful exami-
nation of Chapter 3 of Book IV of the Wealth of Nations
,
which deals
with restraints upon importation, will show that the argument is clo-
sely geared to the earlier debates on Anglo-French trade. And when
the balance-of-trade was no longer significant, Charles James Fox
showed the old Whig hostility to France in opposing the French
Commercial Treaty of 1787 on the grounds that France and England were
natural enemies.
Since anti-French sentiment certainly did not die down during the
eighteenth century, it remains only to ask why the balance of trade
ceased to be of such importance after 1720. Of the change itself many
scholars are in agreement—Charles Wilson and E. A. J. Johnson, for
29
example—and a plentitude of quotes can support them. Let us note
that employment was always an important consideration in English eco-
nomic thought and what needs explanation is the rise and fall of the
balance of trade, rather than the prominence of employment. There
-17-
appear to be four explanations for the decline of the balance-of-trade
scare. First, the need for investible capital, stressed by Max Beer
in
and by Barry Supple, declines with the considerable trade surpluses
31
arising after the Commercial Revolution. Secondly, with the reform
of the coinage and the success of the Bank of England the need for
bullion as a circulating medium became easier to satisfy. Thirdly,
War Finance—an item whose importance is denied by Viner but shown to
be significant by Davis
—
gave rise to the Bank of England and to the
explosive growth of the National Debt and made the balance-of-trade of
32lesser importance. Finally, concern for the power of the nation
became increasingly focussed upon colonial policy rather than the
balance-of-trade and reached fairly mature formulations in the writings
33
of Joshua Gee and Malachy Postlethwayt.
What does all this tell us about the history of economic thought?
First, that the foreign trade doctrines of the English economists is
of little value, unless studied in close conjunction with the detailed
politics of each period. Secondly, that the purely economic views of
the Mercantilists have to be obtained from their micro-economic argu-
ments and their views of the domestic macro-economy. Finally, it
would appear that there is a doctrinal continuity in English economic
thought in the two centuries prior to Adam Smith, but that this is
based on a concern for employment. If the thesis of this paper be
correct, the "balance of trade" was largely a political shibboleth.
-18-
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